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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MUD CONTROL LAB ORA TORIES, 
INC., A Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THERON S. COVEY, et al, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8025 
The plaintiff and appellant in this action is an 
Oklahoma corporation engaged in the business of 
selling certain chemicals and materials generally 
referred to in the oil well drilling trade as "drilling 
mud." These chemicals and materials are mixed 
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with wat<·r at the drill site and forced into the drill 
hok through the drill pipe. They seal off the forma-
tion walls and carry the drill cuttings up from the 
bot torn of the hole (R 110 & 111). The use and con-
trol of this mud and its chemical consistence is a 
specializ<'d occupation. 
The defendants and respondents are one M. E. 
Baird and a group of people referred to in the course 
of the trial of this case and in this brief as "the 
Coveys." They, and some other people not involved 
in this appeal, were co-owners of a leasehold on 
which the Bertie Slaugh No. 1 well was drilled (R 
238). 
On January 5th, 1949, the Coveys made an 
agreement which they denominated "Joint Operating 
Agreement" with M. E. Baird and H. L. Robbins, a 
partnership, for the purpose of getting the drilling of 
the Bertie Slaugh No.1 well under way, and the well 
was drilled pursuant thereto (R239). It was a dry hole. 
The trial court found the Coveys to have been mining 
partners of Baird and Robbins in this venture and, 
as such, jointly responsible for the unpaid expenses of 
drilling said oil well. Since the facts relative to that 
proposition are not within the scope of this appeal, 
no further detail will be indulged in in that regard. 
They are the subject of the Cross-Appeal of the Coveys 
on file herein. 
Between March 7, 1949, and July 27, 1949, Mud 
« 
···' 
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Control Laboratories, Inc., sold and delivered to M. 
E. Baird and H. L. Robbins drilling chemicals and 
mud of the fair and reasonable value of $7,458.10, 
and between July 27, 1949 and July 29, 1949, sold 
and delivered further drilling chemicals and mud of 
a fair and reasonable value of $765.54. No payment 
was made for these goods and the suit below was for 
the purpose of obtaining that payment (R 240). 
During the period prior to July 27, 1949, the 
appellant had not qualified to do business in the State 
of Utah, but on July 27, 1949, did so (R 240 & 241). 
The Court below held that the appellant was entitled 
to be paid by the respondents for the materials sold 
and delivered after it qualified to do business in the 
State of Utah, but was not entitled to be paid for the 
goods sold and delivered prior to qualification, for 
the reason that the appellant was a foreign corpora-
tion doing business in the State of Utah without qual-
ifying so to do and, under the provisions of Section 
16-8-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, its contracts 
would be void. ( R 242) . 
The chemicals involved in this action were man-
ufactured in the United States and several foreign 
countries, and packaged by the manufacturer (R 114 
& 115). Sodium bicarbonate was packaged in a 
multi-wall, special paper bag containing 100 lbs. of 
chemicals and sewn shut. Caustic soda was packed 
in 400 lb. drums sealed so as to be air-tight because 
it solidifies upon contact with air. Tanna-thin was 
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packed in n 4·0 lb. multi-wall, sewn bag. Barium 
carhouat<' was packed in an 80 lb. multi-wall sewn 
bag. Qut·l>racho was packed in a 100 lb. "very 
strong" rnulti-wall bag, wired shut and sewn. (See 
H 11'5 & 116). It sold at about $27.00 a hundred lbs. 
and was packaged in the manner described to avoid 
any wastage or loss(R 116). No product handled by 
the plaintiff was purchased, imported or sold in a 
package containing less than 40 lbs. or more than 
400 lbs. 
The chemicals were customarily sold by appel-
lant directly to the consumers, who are in most in-
stances, and were in this case, persons drilling oil 
wells. Generally the sales and deliveries were made 
to the oil well drilling consumers in large loads, i.e., 
loads of such a size that the purchases made by the 
defendant here would be considered "small loads" 
(R. 131). The purchases involved here were in 
quantities varying from 400 lbs. to 25,600 lbs. and 
averaging just over 2,500 lbs. each (See Exhibit "B"). 
Appellant is one of four major mud companies 
who control the industry, handling the same products 
so far as material and quality is concerned, packed 
in the same sized bags, differing only in color, and 
sold at virtually the same price by each of thein (R 
147). The price varied from day to day (R 124) but 
not from company to company. 
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The ch~1uicals concerned herein were packaged 
by their manufacturers, and shipped in their self-
same packages to Craig, Colorado, where, still in their 
original packages, they were trucked by an interstate 
common carrier, Watson Truck Lines, across the 
Utah state line to Vernal, Utah, (R 114 & 116) where 
they were placed on the property of one L. N. Lis-
com be pending sale and covered with tarpaulins 
(R 241). 
The appellant had in its employ one S. J. Put-
man, who was a sales engineer. Mr. Putman took up 
residence in Vernal, Utah, in the fall of 1948 for the 
purpose of furthering the sales of his employer's pro-
ducts and his duties were to establish customer rela-
tions, to sell chemicals and mud, and to supervise 
and instruct in the use of those products in the dril-
ling of oil wells. He contacted Baird and Robbins 
and a:ryanged to sell them the drilling mud needed 
for the drilling of the Bertie Slaugh No. 1 well. 
Whenever drilling mud was needed on said well, one 
of the tool-pushers or roughnecks went to the Lis-
combe premises and stacked whatever goods were 
needed on his truck. A delivery ticket was made out 
either by Mr. Liscombe or Mr. Putman and the goods 
were taken to the site of the well where they were 
used. The goods were sold in the same packages in 
which they had originally been placed by their manu-
facturer and in which they had been shipped into the 
State of Utah and stored at the Liscombe premises. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
None of th~ packages \Vere part of or contained in any 
larg<>r pac:kag(' or shipping case and all of the pack-
ag<•s W<'n' of appropriate size, material and shape for 
direct use from the package by the well-drilling con-
surners (R 242). The Liscombe property was separ-
ately owned by L. N. Liscombe who was paid by the 
plaintiff on the basis of the quantity of goods placed 
upon his premises and sold therefrom. During the 
time material to this action, no products were stored 
on or were delivered from the Liscombe premises 
excepting the products of the plaintiff ( R 242) . 
In every instance, the sale of the drilling mud 
and chemicals involved in this action to said Baird 
and Robbins was the first sale or use thereof after its 
importation into the State of Utah. 
It was the contention of the appellant that its 
sales -vvere sales in interstate commerce and, as such, 
exempt from the provisions of Sections 16-8-1, and 
16-8-3 U. C. A., This contention was rejected by 
the court below and judgment was entered in ap-
pellant's favor for the value of the goods sold after 
appellant qualified in Utah, to-wit, $765.54 plus 
interest. In its appeal, appellant claims to be 
entitled to the judgment awarded and, in addi-
tion thereto, a further judgment in the amount of 
$7,458.10 plus interest from July 27th, 1949, $7,458. 
10 being the price of the goods sold before appellant 
qualified to do business in Utah. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I 
Sales of goods in interstate commerce are exempt 
from the provisions of Section 16-8-1 and 16-8-3, U. 
C. A., 1953. 
II 
All of the sales concerned in this action are sales 
in interstate commerce under the original package 
doctrine. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
Sales of Goods in Interstate Commerce are 
Exempt From the Provisions of Sections 
16-8-1 and 16-8-3, U. C. A. 1953. 
Section 16-8-1, U. C. A., 1953, requires every 
foreign corporation, before doing any business within 
Utah, to file with the County Clerk of the County in 
which its principal place of business is situated, and 
with the Secretary of State, ( 1) copies of its Articles 
of Incorporation, Amendments, and By-Laws, duly 
certified, (2) an acceptance of the provisions of the 
Constitution of Utah and a designation of some per-
son residing in said County as process agent, (3) a 
statement setting forth the business it proposes to 
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transact in Utah and the amount and proportion of 
its stock represeHted by property located or to be 
acquired in Utah. Further, the corporation must pay 
cPrLain filing fees. Section 16-8-3, U. C. A. 1953, 
provides, among other things, that anyone failing to 
con1ply with the provisions of Section 16-8-1, supra, 
may not maintain any action in any courts of this 
state and that every contract, agreement and trans-
action whatsoever made or entered into by or on 
behalf of any such corporation within this state shall 
be wholly void on behalf of such corporation. 
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of the 
United States provides as follows: 
"The Congress shall have power * * *: 
To regulate commerce with foreign nations, 
and among the several states, and with the 
Indian tribes; * * *." 
The respondents contended, and the court below 
held, that the provisions of Section 16-8-3, U. C. A., 
1953, barred the appellant from collecting for any 
goods sold prior to the time appellant qualified to do 
business in Utah. This prevented appellant from 
getting judgment for $7,458.10 for which respondents 
would otherwise have been held liable. It is the 
position of appellant that the court below erred in 
this holding for the reason that the sales involved in 
this case were sales in interstate commerce and, as 
such, exempt from the operation of the statutes re-
quiring qualification to do business. 
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That sales in interstate commerce are exempt 
from the operation of these particular statutes has 
been established in the State of Utah by the decision 
of this court in the case of Advance-Rumely Thresher 
Co. vs. Stohl, 75 Utah 12+, 283 P. 731. We quote from 
page 132 of Yol. 75, Utah Reports: 
"The transaction involved in this case 
being an interstate one, the plaintiff is entitled 
to maintain its action notwithstanding it has 
never complied with the laws of this state with 
respect to foreign corporations doing business 
within the state. Sioux Remedy Company vs. 
Cope, 235 U. S. 197, 35 Sup. Ct. 57, 59 L. Ed. 
193." 
This case properly followed the clear rule of the 
Supreme Court of the United States in a case in which 
this precise point was decided. In the case of Sioux 
Remedy Co. vs. Cope, cited above by the Utah Su-
preme Court, in an unanimous opinion delivered by 
Mr. Justice Van Devanter, it was held that a South 
Dakota statute requiring foreign corporations to qual-
ify to do business in South Dakota before bringing 
suit to recover the purchase price of goods sold to resi-
dents of that state was unconstitutional as a viola-
tion of the commerce clause when applied to sales 
in interstate commerce. The holding of the Supreme 
Court is succinctly digested in the headnotes of thoe 
case as follows: 
" ( 1 ) The right of a foreign corporation 
to demand and enforce payment of goods sold 
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in int<>rstate commerce, if not a part of such 
con1men:<', i~ so directly connected with it, 
and is so essential to its existence and continu-
ann·, that the imposition of unreasonable con-
ditions upon this right must necessarily operate 
as a restraint or burden on interstate com-
mPrce. 
(2) Interstate commerce is unconstitu-
tionally burdened by the provisions of S. D. 
Rev. Codes, 1903, Section 883, 885, under 
which, as construed by the highest state court, 
the right of a foreign corporatio:q to enforce 
payment in a South Dakota court of the pur-
chase price of merchandise which the corpora-
tion has lawfully sold within the state in inter:. 
state commerce is conditioned upon compli-
ance with the requirements of those sections 
that a foreign corporation, before it can sue in 
the local courts, must first appoint a resident 
agent upon whom process may be served in 
any action against it, and must file a copy of 
such appointment, and a copy of its charter, 
and pay the incidental filing and recording 
fees." 
In the case of Furst v. Brewster, 282 U.S. 493, 75 
L. ed. 478, in a unanimous opinion written by 
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes it was held that the statute 
of the State of Arkansas requiring every foreign cor-
poration doing business in that state to file a copy 
of its charter, duly certified, and a statement of its 
assets and liabilities and designate a process agent in 
that state under penalty of being unable to make any 
enforceable contract in the state of Arkansas, was 
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unconstitutional \Yhen applied to sales of goods in 
interstate commerce. The reason again \'Vas a con-
flict \Yith the comm('rce clause of the Constitution 
of the United States. 
In Yie'Y of the clear holdings of the Supreme 
Court of the United States and of the fact that the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah has specifically 
followed the ruling of that court, it appears that 
there can be no questioning the proposition that, as 
applied to sales in interstate commerce, the provisions 
of Section 16-8-1 and 16-8-3, U. C. A. 1953, are 
unconstitutional and hence void. 
Point II 
All of the Sales Concerned in the Action are 
Sales in Interstate Commerce Under the 
Original Package Doctrine. 
As pointed out above, sales in interstate com-
n1erce are exempt from the operation of our statutes 
relative to the qualification of a foreign corporation 
to do business in the State of Utah. If the sales in-
volved in this action are sales in interstate commerce, 
they necessarily partake of that immunity and judg-
ment should be entered for the full amount of the 
goods sold and delivered by appellant to respondents. 
This would add a judgment for the sum of $7,458.10 
plus interest from July 27, 1949, to the judgment 
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below. JudgmPnt below was for $765.54 and interest. 
All the sales involved in this action were sales 
in intt~rstate cmnmerce by virtue of the fact that they 
\'\'<'n~ sales of goods in the original unbroken packages 
in \Yhich they were imported into the state, were sales 
by the importer of those goods, and were the first 
sales made after the importation. 
The original package doctrine is a rule which 
states that, so long as goods which have been im-
ported from a foreign country or from a foreign state 
remain in the odginal unbroken package in which 
they were imported into the state and are unsold, 
they are free from control or regulation by the state 
into which they were imported, and that this protec-
tion extends also to the first sale of those goods. This 
doctrine came into the law in the case of Brown v. 
Maryland, 12 Wheat 419, 6 L. ed. 678, in an opinion 
written by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall. 
In. that case Maryland had a statute requiring 
"all importers of foreign articles or commodities, of 
dry goods, wares or merchandise, by bale or package 
* * *" to obtain a license at a cost of $50.00 before 
selling the same. Brown imported a package of dry 
goods and sold it without obtaining a license. It was 
held that, when applied to the sale of goods in the 
original package in which imported, the statute was 
unconstitutional for the reason that it was repugnant 
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to that provision of the constitution of the United 
States \Yhic h declares, that "no state shall, without 
the consent of Congress~ lay any impost, or duty on 
imports or exports, except what may be absolutely 
necessary for executing its inspection laws;" and to 
that \Yhich declares that Congress shall have the 
po"ver "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, 
among the several states and with the Indian tribes." 
'Yhen a case came up involving the importing of 
goods into a state from a sister state instead of from 
a foreign country, the Supreme Court adopted the 
_original package doctrine of Brown v. Maryland as 
the standard for use in determining when commerce 
ended and the control of the commerce clause ceased. 
The leading case in this regard is Leisy v. Hardin, 135 
U.S. 100, 34 L. ed. 128, 10 S.C. 681. In that case 
122 quarter barrels of beer, 171 one-eighth barrels of 
beer and 11 cases of beer were seized by the City 
Marshal of Keokuk under a state statute prohibiting 
the sale of intoxicating liquors. It was held that the 
state could not prohibit the importation of that beer, 
from abroad or from a sister state; or, when imported, 
prohibit its sale by the importer so long as it remained 
in the casks in which it was imported. The holdings 
of interest in the present case are summarized by 
the Supreme Court in the headnotes as follows: 
"1. A citizen of one State has the right to 
import be·er into another State, and the right 
to sell it there in its original packages. 
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2. As to such sale, the State has no power 
to intc-rf{·n· by seisure, or any other action, to 
pn'v<'nt the importation and sale by a foreign 
or non-resident importer. 
3. The right of transportation of an ar-
ticle of commerce from one State to another 
includes tlze right of the consignee to sell it in 
unbroken packages at the place where the 
transportation terminates. 
4. It is only after the importation is com-
pleted and the property imported is mingled 
with and becomes a part of the general pro-
perty of the State by a sale by the importer, 
that State regulations can act upon it. 
5. The power vested in Congress to regu-
late commerce among the states cannot be 
stopped at the external boundary of a state, 
but is capable of authorizing the disposition 
within the State of the article imported." 
(Italics ours.) 
Under the authorities, the application of the 
"original package" doctrine has been different in re-
lation to tax cases than in relation to non-tax cases. 
The reason for the distinction is the decision that, so 
long as any goods partake of the protection and bene-
fits of the laws of a state, they must pay their fair 
share of the tax burdens pertaining thereto. So long 
as the tax is non-discriminatory, it applies as well to 
articles in their original packages as to articles not in 
their original packages. This exception, however, 
applies only to imports from a sister state and does 
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not apply to imports from a foreign country. This 
proposition is \Yell stated in the case of City of Win-
chester vs. Lohrey Packing Company, 237 S.W. 2d, 
868, at page 869 as follo\vs: 
"The city is correct in its contention that 
one engaged in interstate commerce is not 
exempt from local taxation. The United States 
Supreme Court has said many times, 'interstate 
commerce must pay its way', and that it is 
not the purpose of the commerce clause, 'tore-
lieve those engaged in interstate commerce of 
their just share of state tax burdens, merely 
because an incidental or consequential effect 
of the tax is an increase in the costs of doing 
business'." 
For the a hove reason, tax cases do not constitute 
authority under the "original package" doctrine 
when applied to non-tax situations. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has 
uniformly held in non-tax cases involving the "orig-
inal package" doctrine that the freedom from state 
regulation furnished by the commerce clause extends 
not only to the transportation of the goods into the 
state, but also to the sale of those goods by the im-
porter. The reason for this is that, if the State had 
the right to regulate the sale of goods imported in 
interstate commerce, it would have the right to effec-
tively control that commerce by prohibiting or other-
wise limiting the sale of such goods. To control the 
sale of goods imported in interstate commerce is to 
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<'ffe('t ivdy control the commerce itself, and this 
would bP a violation of the commerce clause. 
OnP of the leading case~ on this point is Dahnke-
ll 'alkcr J1!illing Company vs. C. T. Bondurant, 257 
U. S. 282, 66 L. Ed. 239, 42 S. Ct. 106. This, too, is 
a casp involving a statute requiring a foreign corpora-
tion to qualify to do business in a state. The plaintiff 
was a Tennessee corporation that sent an agent into 
Kentucky where he purchased a crop of wheat. The 
contract was entered into in the state of Kentucky, 
the wheat was pajJ for in the state of Kentucky, was 
delivered in the state of Kentucky to railroad cars on 
which it was to be shipped to the plaintiff in Ten-
nessee. The defendant failed to deliver the balance 
of the vv·heat agreed on under this contract, the plain-
tiff sued for damages, and the Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky held that the plaintiff was barred from suing 
by virtue of its failure to comply with the require-
ment to qualify to do business in the state of Ken-
tucky. The U. S. Supreme Court reversed that de-
cision, Justice Van Devanter delivering the opinion, 
and saying: 
"The commerce clause of the Constitution, 
Art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 3, expressly commits to Con-
gress and impliedly withholds from the several 
states the power to regulate commerce among 
the later. Such commerce is not confined to 
transportation from one state to another, but 
cornprehends all commercial intercourse be-
tween different states and all the component 
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parts of that intercourse. Where goods in one 
state are transported into another for purposes 
of sale, the commerce does not end with the 
transportation, but embraces as well the sale 
of the goods after they reach their destination, 
and \Yhile they are in the original packages. 
Brown vs. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 446, 447, 
6 L. ed. 678, 688, 689; American Steel & Wire 
Company vs. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 519 48, L. 
ed. 538, 546, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 365. On the same 
principle, where goods are purchased in one 
state for transportation to another, the com-
merce includes the purchase quite as much as 
it does the transportation. American Express 
Company vs. Iowa, 196 U.S. 133, 143,49 L. ed. 
417, 422, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 182. This has been 
recognized in many decisions construing the 
commerce clause. Thus it was said in Welton 
vs. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347, 349: 
" 'Commerce' is a term of the largest import. 
It comprehends intercourse for the purposes of 
trade in any and all its forms, including the 
transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange 
of commodities.,-, In Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. 
S. 1, 220, 32 L. ed. 346, 350, 2 Inters. Com. 
Rep. 232, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6, it was tersely said: 
"Buying and selling and the transportation 
incidental thereto constitute commerce." In 
United States vs. E. C. Knight Company, 156 
U. S. 1, 13, 39 L. ed. 325, 329, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
249, "contracts to buy, sell, or exchange goods 
to be transported among the several states" 
were declared "part of the interstate trade or 
commerce." And in Addyston Pipe & Steel 
Company vs. United States, 175 U. S. 211, 241, 
44 L. ed. 136, 147, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 96, the 
Court referred to the prior decisio:ps as esta b-
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lishing that "interstate commerce consists of 
inh'JToursp and traffic between the citizens or 
illhabitaJits of different states, and includes not 
only the transportation of persons and pro-
perty and the navigation of public waters for 
that purpose, but also the purchase, sale, and 
exchange of commodities." In no case has the 
Court made any distinction between buying 
and selling, or between buying for transpor-
tation to another state and transporting for 
sale in another state. Quite to the contrary, 
the import of the decisions has been that if the 
transportation was incidental to buying or 
selling, it was not material whether it came 
first or last. 
"A corporation of one state may go into 
another, without obtaining the leave or license 
of the latter, for all the legitmate purposes of 
such commerce; and any statute of the latter 
state which obstructs or lays a burden on the 
exercise of this privilege is void under the com-
merce clause. Crutcher vs. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 
47, 57, 35 L. ed. 649, 652, Sup. Ct. Rep. 851; 
lVestern Union Telegraph Company vs. Kan-
sas, 26 U.S. 1, 27, 54 L. ed. 355, 366, 30 Sup. 
Ct. Rep. 190; International Textbook Company 
vs. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 112, 54 L. ed. 678, 687, 
27 L. R. A. CN.S.) 493, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 481, 18 
Ann. Cas. 1103; Sioux Remedy Co. vs. Cope, 
235 U.S. 197, 59 L. ed. 193, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
57. * * * 
"For these reasons, we are of the opinion 
that the transaction was a part of interstate 
commerce, in which the plaintiff lawfully 
could engage without any permission from the 
I 
:~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
state of Kentucky, and that the statute in ques-
tion, '"hich concededly imposed burdensome 
conditions, was, as to that transaction, invalid 
because repugnant to the commerce clause." 
The doctrine of the Bondurant case above is af-
firmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
the most recent decision of that court relating directly 
to the original package doctrine. That case is Wallace 
vs. Currin, 95 Fed. 2d 856, affirmed 58 S. C. 3 79; 
306 U.S. 1, 83 L. ed. 441. See particularly the quo-
tation of the Circuit Court in 95 Fed. 2d, at page 862, 
setting forth the above rule verbatim. 
A case very similar to the case at bar is Talbot 
vs. Smith, et al, 277 S. W. 25 7. In that case the goods 
concerned were aluminum sets which were in their 
original package, and were at rest in the State of 
Kentucky, awaiting sale. Thereafter they were sold, 
still in their original packages, by agents of the 
plaintiff company, under a contract with a local 
merchant who guaranteed payment for the sets. 
When the plaintiff company sought to collect from 
the local merchant, the merchant pleaded that the 
plaintiff had failed to file a certificate of doing busi-
ness under an assumed name, and thus was barred 
from recovery. The plaintiff pleaded that it was, 
in making and carrying out the contracts of sale, en-
gaged in interstate commerce. 
The court held for the plaintiff, saying: 
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"In a case like this, the decisions of the 
Supreme Court of the United States are con-
trolling. The rule adopted by that court is 
that, where goods in one state are transported 
into another for purposes of sale, the commerce 
does not end with the transportation, but em-
braces as well the sale of the goods after they 
reach their destination, while they are in the 
original packages. In applying this rule, no 
distinction is made between buying and sell-
ing, or between buying for transportation to 
another state and transporting for sale in an-
other state. On the contrary, the rule is that, 
if the transportation is incidental to the buying 
or selling, it is immaterial whether it comes 
first or last. Dahnke-Walker Milling Company 
vs. Bondurant. The evidence discloses that 
the goods were shipped from another state in 
fulfillment of a contract which appellant made 
with appellees, and for the purpose of sale in 
this state in accordance with terms of the con-
tract. Soon after the goods reached Bowling 
Green, and while they were in the original 
packages, they were sold and delivered to pur-
chasers pursuant to orders taken by the crew 
of salesmen. In other words, the case is one 
where the goods were transported for the pur-
pose of sale, and the sales were made after the 
goods reached their destination, and while 
they were in the original packages. That be- '-
ing true, the entire transaction was one of in-
terstate commerce. It follows that Section 
199 b1, Kentucky Statutes, is inoperative. * * *" 
The most recent original package case cited in 
the digests is Pace Manufacturing Company vs. Milli-
ken, 70 F. Supp. 740. In that case the sheriff seized 
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a shipment of 25 slot machines while in their original 
packages. They \Yen~ held to be in interstate com-
merce and free from state regulation, even police reg-
ulation because "at~ the time of seizure the goods 
were in the original unbroken packages in possession 
of the Railway Express Agency." 
The rule is again stated by the Supreme Court 
In the case of Department of Public Utilities vs. 
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company, 108 S.W. 2d 586, 
194 Ark. 354, aff. 58 S. Ct. 770, 304 U. S. 61, 82 L. 
ed. 1149, as follows: 
"The general rule is that as long as an 
article imported remains in the hands of an 
importer in the original and unbroken package 
in which it is imported, it is protected by the 
commerce clause of the Constitution from in-
terference of state laws, and that it is only 
when the original package has been sold by 
the importer * * * * that it becomes subject 
to state legislation." 
Are the goods in the principal case in 
their "original packages" within the meaning 
of the doctrine? 
In the argument below counsel for the respond-
ent argued, and the court appeared to rule in favor of, 
the following propositions: 
1. That a package which is sold to the ultimate 
consumer and is of a size suitable for use by such 
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ultimate consumer is not an original package within 
the Ineaning of the doctrine. 
2. That a package which is sold at retail by the 
in1portPr cannot be an original package within the 
meaning of the doctrine, for the doctrine is restricted 
solely to sales to wholesalers by the persons importing 
them into this state. 
3. That only packages consisting of an aggre-
gate of smaller packages are within the scope of the 
meaning of the phrase "original package," and that, 
therefore, a package filled with a substance which is 
the same throughout and is not divided into smaller 
packages is not within the scope of the doctrine. 
These propositions have been fought out with 
some bitterness by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in a series of cases beginning with Schollen-
berger vs. Pennsylvania, 18 S. C. 757, 171 U. S. 1, 
43 L. ed. 49, continuing through Austin vs. Tennessee, 
21 S.C. 132,179 U.S. 343, 45 L. ed. 244, Cook vs. 
Marshall County, 25 S.C. 233, 96 U. S. 261, 49 L. ed. 
471 and concluded in Kirmeyer vs. Kansas, 35 S. C. 
419,236 U.S. 568, 58 L. ed. 721. The Schollenberger 
case, the Austin case and the Cook case all contain 
long discussions of the original package doctrine and 
the size and type of packages to which it applies. 
In the Schollenberger case it was held that a 10 
lb. tub of oleomargarine and a 40 lb. tub of oleomar-
I 
• 
I 
j 
l 
l 
• 
' 
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garine sold to the ultimate consumf'r by one who had 
imported them from a sistf'r state were original pack-
ages \Yithin the meaning of the doctrine and as such 
\Yere protected from the provisions of a statute pro-
hibiting the sale of oleomargarine. This case clearly 
shows that no distinction is to be made between sales 
at retail and \Yholesale, sales to the ultimate consumer 
and not to the ultimate consumer, and sales of goods 
\Yhich are the same throughout the entire package 
and those \Yhich are divided into smaller packages 
contained in a larger snipping package. In this case 
the entire Supreme Court was in accord as to what 
constituted an original package but there was a dis-
sent by Mr. Justice Gray and Mr. Justice Harlan on 
the question of whether oleomargarine was a dele-
terious substance and subject to being excluded from 
a state by state law under the police powers. Of 
particular note is the following language at page 56 
of vol. 49, L. ed.: 
"The question is whether a package in-
tended and used for the supply of the retail 
trade is an 'original package' within the pro-
tection of the interstate commerce cases. * * * 
At page 58 the court continues: 
"We are not aware of any such distinction 
as is attempted to be made by the court below 
in these cases between a sale at wholesale to 
individuals engaged in the wholesale trade or 
one at retail to the consumer. How small may 
be an original package it is not necessary to 
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hPn' detern1ine. We do say that a sale of a 
10 pound package of oleomargarine, manufac-
tured, packed, marked, imported and sold un-
dPr the circumstances set forth in detail in 
thP special verdict, was a valid sale, although 
to a pt·rson who was himself a consumer. We 
do not say or intimate that this right of sale 
extended beyond the first sale by the importer 
after its arrival within this State. * * * 
"The importer had the right to sell, not 
only personally, but he had the right to em-
ploy an agent to sell for him. Otherwise, his 
right to sell would be substantially valueless, 
for it cannot be supposed that he would be 
personally engaged in the sale of every orig-
inal package sent to the different states in the 
union. Having the right to sell through his 
agent, a sale thus effected is valid. 
"The right of the importer to sell cannot 
depend upon whether the original package is 
suitable for retail trade or not. His right to sell 
is the same, whether to consumers or to whole-
sale dealers in the article, provided he sells 
them in original packages." 
It should be noted that the special findings 
referrrd to in this case (49 L. ed. at page 56) were: 
"That the package in which the oleomar-
garine was sold * * * was of such form, size, 
and weight as is used by producers or shippers 
for the purpose of securing both the conven-
ience in handling and security in transporta-
tion of merchandise between dealers in the 
ordinary course of actual commerce and the 
said form, size, and weight were adopted in 
l 
I 
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good faith, and not for the purpose of evading 
the la\YS of the common\Yealth of Pennsylvania, 
said package being one of a number of similar 
packages forming one consignment shipped 
by the said company to the said defendant." 
Some t\YO years later in the case of Austin vs. 
Tennessee, supra, the exact same Justices were called 
upon to decide \IYhether the protection of th com-
merce clause under the original package doctrine 
should be extended to small packages containing ten 
cigarettes which were stacked by the manufacturer 
on warehouse floor, picked up by the express com-
pany in baskets, carried in those baskets to the pur-
chaser and dumped out at the purchaser's place of 
business by the express company in contravention 
of a Tennessee statute providing that no one could 
bring cigarettes into the state for the purpose of 
selling, giving away or otherwise disposing of them. 
The two holdings of importance in this latter 
case were, first, that a prohibition against the im-
portation of cigarettes is a legitimate exercise of 
police powers by a state, and, second, that small 
paper packages of cigarettes, three inches in length 
and one and one-half inches in width containing 
ten cigarettes were not original packages within 
the meaning of the doctrine and within its pro-
tection from interference by state laws, but, if 
there was any original package, it was the basket 
in which they were transported. On both these 
questions there was a serious split in the Court, 
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the n1ajority opnuon being written by Mr. Justice 
Brown and concurn•d in by three other Justices, Mr. 
Justin• \Vhite concurring specially, and the Chief 
.Jus lin· and t lin'<' other Justices dissenting in a long 
and spirited diss<>nt. The first holding is not germane 
to th(• cas<> before us at this time and we shall refer 
only to thosP portions of the case dealing with the 
sC'cond proposition. After a review of the history of 
the original package doctrine, the majority opinion 
summarized its holdings as follows, on pages 232 
and 233, Vol. 45, L. ed.: 
"The real question in this case is whether 
the size of the package in which the importa-
tion as actually made is to govern, or the size 
of the package in which bona fide transactions 
are carried on between the manufacturer and 
the wholesale dealer residing in different 
states. "\Ve hold to the latter view. The whole 
theory of the exemption of the original pack-
age from the operation of state laws is based 
upon the idea that the property is imported in 
the ordinary form in which, from time im-
memorial, foreign goods have been brought 
into the country. These have gone at once 
into the hands of the wholesale dealers, who 
have been in the habit of breaking the pack- \ 
ages and distributing their contents among 
the several retail dealers throughout the state. 
It was with reference to this method of doing 
business that the doctrine of the exemption of 
the original package grew up. By taking the 
words 'original package' in their literal sense, 
a number of so-called original package manu-
factories have been started through the coun-
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try, \Yhose business it is to manufacture goods 
for the exprt:'ss purpose of sending their pro-
ducts into other states in minute packages, that 
may at once go into the hands of the retail 
dealers and consumers, and thus bid defiance 
to the la\YS of the state against their importa-
tion and sale. In all the cases which have 
heretofore arisen in this court the packages 
\Yere of such size as to exclude the idea that 
they were to go directly into the hands of the 
consumer, or be used to evade the police regu-
lations of the state with regard to the particu-
lar article. No doubt the fact that cigarettes 
are actually imported in a certain package is 
strong evidence that they are original packages 
within the meaning of the law; but this pre-
sumption attaches only when the importation 
is made in the usual manner prevalent among 
honest dealers, and a bona fide package of a 
particular size. Without undertaking to deter-
mine what is the proper size of an original 
package in each case, evidently the doctrine 
has no application where the manufacturer 
puts up the package with the express intent of 
evading the laws of another state, and is en-
abled to carry out his purpose by the facile 
agency of an express company and the conni-
vance of his consignee. This court has re-
peatedly held that, so far from lending its 
authority to frauds upon the sanitary laws of 
the several state, we are bound to respect such 
laws and to aid in their enforcement, so far 
as can be done without infringing upon the 
constitutional rights of the parties.* * * (Italics 
ours). 
"There could hardly be stronger evidence 
of fraud than is shown by the facts of this case, 
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which we quote from the opinion of the court: 
'The defendant purchased from the Amer-
ican Tobacco Company, at its factory, in Dur-
ham, North Carolina, a lot of cigarettes manu-
factured by that company at that factory, and 
then~ by it put into pasteboard boxes, in quan-
tities of ten cigarettes to each box; that each 
of these boxes, known as packages, was sep-
arately stamped and labeled, as prescribed by 
the United States revenue statute; that after 
defendant's purchase the American Tobacco 
Company piled upon the floor of its warehouse 
in Durham, North Carolina, the number of 
boxes or packages sold, and, having done so, 
notified the Southern Express Company to 
come and get them, and said company, by its 
agent, took them from the floor and placed 
them in an open basket already and previously 
in the possession of the Southern Express Com-
pany, and in that basket had them transported 
by express to the defendant's place of business 
and lifted from it on to the counter of the 
defendant the lot of detached boxes or packages 
of cigarettes, and thereupon took a receipt and 
departed with the empty basket. Thereafter 
the defendant sold one of these boxes or pack-
ages without breaking it, and for that sale he 
stands convicted.' 
"And yet we are told that each one of 
these packages is an original package, and en-
titled to the protection of the Constitution of 
the United States as a separate and distinct 
importation. We can only look upon it as a 
discreditable subterfuge to which this court 
ought not to lend its countenance. If there be 
any original package at all in this case we 
think it is the basket, and not the paper box." 
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l\Ir. Justice 'Yhite~ whose position determined 
the matter in a court other\lvise split four to four, 
concurring said: 
··I do not understand that anything in the 
opinion of the court impairs the doctrine pro-
tecting original packages from interference 
by the police or any other power of the state, 
as announced by so many opinions of this 
court, especially as expounded in Leisy v. 
Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 34 L. ed. 128, 3 Inters. 
Con1. Rep. 36, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681, and Rhodes 
v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412, 42 L. ed. 1088, 18 Sup. 
Ct. Rep. 664, and the authorities which are 
cited in the opinions of the court in both of 
these cases. If I thought either the opinion 
of the court just announced or the conclusion 
which it reaches had the effect of weakening 
the doctrine upheld by the authorities to which 
I had just referred, I should be unable to con-
cur. Indeed, as I understand the case as now 
decided, all the questions adverted to are 
merged in the solution of the one decisive issue, 
which is, Was each particular parcel of cigar-
ettes an original package vvithin the constitu-
tional import of those words as defined by 
the previous adjudications of the court? I am 
constrained to conclude that this question is 
correctly answered in the negative, not only 
from the size of each particular parcel, but 
from all the surrounding facts and circum-
stances, among which may be mentioned the 
trifling value of each parcel, the absence of an 
address on each, and the fact that many par-
cels for the purpose of commercial shipment, 
were aggregated, thrown into and carried in 
an open basket. Thus associated in their ship-
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Inent, they could not, under all the facts and 
c ircutnstancPs of the case, after arrival be 
s<'~regat(•d so as to cause each to become an 
original package." 
In the dissenting opinion written by Mr. Justice 
Br<'\\'<'r and concurred in by the Chief Justice, Mr. 
Justice Shiras and Mr. Justice Peckham appears the 
following language: 
"Recently in Schollenberger vs. Pennsyl-
z·ania, supra, \Ye held that an importer had a 
right to import oleomargarine in 10 pound 
packages, and sell it in such a package at retail 
to a consumer. Apparently the dividing line 
as to the size of packages must be somewhere 
between that of a 10 pound package of oleo-
margarine and that of a package of ten cigar-
ettes; but where? Must diamonds, in order to 
be within the protecting power of the nation, 
be carried from state to state in 10 pound pack-
ages?" 
Because of the conflict and the split in the Court, 
the particular cigarette company involved com-
menced to ship its small boxes of cigarettes loose, 
that is, the packages of ten cigarettes each were piled 
on the floor of the warehouse, were picked up by the 
express company by shovelling them into some sort 
of wagon or carrier, placing them in the express car 
loose and delivering them in the same manner. The 
question of whether that placed them within the 
original package doctrine came up for decision and 
was decided some five years later by a court composed 
of the same Chief Justice, six of the same Associate 
I 
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Justices and Justices Oliver \Vendell Holmes and 
'Villiam R. Day, in the case of Cook v. Marshall 
County, supra. There the Court reaffirmed the pro-
position that their holding in the Austin case was 
based on the fact that the method of shipping 
'vas merely a convenient subterfuge for evading the 
la'v forbidding the sale of cigarettes within the State, 
\Yas fraudulent in its purpose and procedure, and was 
not a usual method of interstate shipment." The 
following language of the majority opinion found in 
49 L. ed. at pages 474-475, is significant: 
"The term 'original package' is not de-
fined by any statute and is simply a conven-
ient form of expression adopted by Chief Jus-
tice Marshall in Brown v. Maryland. to indi-
cate that a license tax could not be exacted of 
an importer of goods from a foreign country 
who disposes of such goods in the form in 
which they were imported. It is not denied 
that, in the changed and changing conditions 
of commerce between the states, packages in 
which these shipments may be made from one 
state to another may be smaller than those 
'bales, hogsheads, barrels, or tierces,' to which 
the term was originally applied by Chief Jus-
tice Marshall, but whatever the form or size 
employed, there must be a recognition of the 
fact that the transaction is a bona fide one, and 
that the usual methods of interstate shipment 
have not been departed from for the purpose 
of evading the police laws of the states. (Italics 
ours.) 
"In Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 34 L. 
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<'d. 128, 3 Int<'rs. Com. Rep. 36, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
G81, quarl<'r barrels, and even one-eighth bar-
rPls and cases of beer, were recognized as 
original packages or kegs, though the size of 
sue h packages and the usual methods of trans-
porting bePr do not seem to have been made the 
subject of discussion. T~ere is nothing in the 
opinion to indicate that it was not legitimate 
to ship beer in kegs of this size. So, too, in 
Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, oleomargar-
ine transported and sold in packages of 10 
pounds weight was recognized as bona fide, 
but it was expressly found by the jury in that 
case that the package was an original package, 
as required by the act of Congress, and was of 
such 'form, size, and weight as is used by pro-
ducers or shippers for the purpose of securing 
both convenience in handling and security in 
transportation of merchandise between dealers 
in the ordinary course of actual commerce, 
and the said form, size, and weight were 
adopted in good faith, and not for the purpose 
of evading the laws of the commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, said package being one of a 
number of similar packages forming one con-
signment, shipped by the said company to the 
said defendant.' While it may be impossible 
to define the size or shape of an original pack-
age, the principle upon which the doctrine is 
founded would not justify us in holding that 
any package which could not be commercially 
transported from one state to another as a 
separate importation could be considered as 
an original pacakage." 
In that case, Mr. Justice White affirmed his 
i II 
I , 
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concurrence and the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Brewer 
and l\llr. Jnstic Peckham dissented. 
This case clearly established as the test the 
questions: 
1. Is the transaction a bona fide one? and 
2. Have the usual methods of interstate ship-
ment been departed from for the purpose of evading 
the police laws of the state? 
Ten years later, before a court cons1st1ng of 
Chief Justice White, Justices McKenna, Holmes, and 
Day, as the only remaining Justices of the court 
which decided the Cook case, there arose in the case 
of Kirmeyer vs. Kansas, supra, the question of whether 
a dealer in intoxicating liquor who had his warehouse 
at Stillings, Missouri, just across the river from 
Leavenv1orth, Kansas, and sold liquor to the "family 
trade" for private use via J:ail and telephone orders 
by setting aside cases, kegs or casks in his warehouse 
in Stillings, tagging them with the names of the 
purchasers and sending them daily over the bridge 
in his own wagons to the residences of the purchasers 
in Leavenworth, Kansas, was protected from inter-
ference in his occupation by the original package 
doctrine. It was held that he was so protected even 
though his trade was a retail trade and, even though 
a barrel or a cask of liquor or beer contains goods 
which are the same throughout and are not broken 
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up into smaller packages. In the following language 
of the court is of substantial interest: 
"Improper application was given to what 
was said in Austin vs. Tennessee and Cook vs. 
1\larshall County, supra. The point for decision 
in th~m was whether the packages containing 
cig.arettes shipped into the state were 'original' 
ones within the constitutional import of the 
term, as theretofore defined. Looking at all 
tlw circumstances this court concluded they 
were not. The general use of like packages 
was unknown and impractical in transactions 
between manufacturers and wholesale dealers 
residing in different states, and the plan pur-
sued was plainly a mere device designed to 
defeat the policy of the state where the goods 
were received,-not a bona fide commercial 
arrangement. Here no such question is pre-
sented." 
What then is the result when these rules and 
distinctions laid down by the highest court of the 
land are applied to the case now before us? In the 
principal case there is no evidence whatever of any 
fraudulent purpose, intent or design on the part of 
appellant. Respondents have never contended that 
the transaction was not bona fide or that the method 
of shipping adopted by appellant was designed to 
evade regulations passed under the police powers of 
the state. Surely no one believes that the importa-
tion of oil well drilling chemicals into this state en-
dangers the health, welfare or morals of our citizens. 
These importations are beneficial, making possible 
I ,, 
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the development of our great oil reserves. This 
leaves us then \Yith a question of whether the pack-
ages used here are such packages as are ordinarily 
used in the trade, i.e., vYhether they are packages 
comparable to the packages of cigarettes or to the 
10 lb. tub of oleomargarine~ 
According to the testimony of Mr. Putman (R 
147), four major mud companies generally control 
the industry and all handle the same products so far 
as material and quality is concerned and in all 
instances each chemical is packed in the same size 
bags or casks, differing as between companies only 
in color. Further, those packages are packaged "all 
over the world" by their manufacturers in the same 
packages in which they were imported into this 
state and sold (R 114 & 115). These facts clearly 
show that the packages concerned in this case are 
the usual packages in the trade, are packages as 
they are packaged pursuant to a bona fide com-
mercial arrangement and in accordance with the 
manner in which this particular kind of goods 
have been and still are brought into this country from 
foreign countries and into this state from both foreign 
countries and foreign states. 
That one of the important chemicals involved 
is ruinec.l if it comes into contact with air, is packed 
in drums which are air tight, and contain 400 lbs. 
of material appears to us to demonstrate conclusively 
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that the method of packaging was adopted ·to safe-
guard the chemical during its transportation so that 
no break would accur in the airtight seal required for 
it to remain in a usuable state. That this package is 
used by the ultimate consumer results not from any 
intention to design it for use in a retail trade, rather 
it results from the fact that the ultimate consumers 
in this instance use the product involved herein in 
tremendous quantities, in such quantities in fact 
that a 400 lb. drum is a convenient and usable unit. 
The strong bags in which the other chemicals are 
packed, the fact that some of them are sewed up with 
wire bands so as to avoid any loss of their expensive 
contents, further illustrates the proposition that these 
packages are designed for safety and convenience in 
transportation. To have them be of a size that is 
convenient for use by a single man at the well 
drilling site is an incidental, though desirable, fea 4 
ture. The Schollenberger case, supra, and the Kir-
meyer case, supra, conclusively established that the 
fact that a package is usable by the ultimate consumer 
in the form in which it is imported does not per se 
take that package outside the scope of the original 
package doctrine. 
' 1 
Of additional importance is the fact that the 
chemicals involved in this case are generally pur-
chased by the ultimate consumer from the importer ~ 
in lots of more than a ton. (See statement on page 4, 
supra, and Exhibit "B".) It is more in the nature of 
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an industrial trade than what we generally consider 
to be retail trade. 
In light of the principles laid down by the Su-
preme Court of the United States in the Schollen-
berger, Austin, Cook, and Kirmeyer cases, supra, the 
goods imported and sold by appellant to respondents 
were clearly in their "original packages" within the 
meaning of the doctrine that establishes that, until sold 
or broken, they are protected under the commerce 
clause from regulation or control by the individual 
states. 
Counsel for respondents suggested below that 
the original package doctrine is no longer the law. 
This proposition is refuted by the holding in Pace 
Manufacturing Co. vs. Milliken, supra, a recent case. 
That it was still a living doctrine in April of 1948 is 
pointed out by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 
Commonwealth vs. Bayuk Cigars, 359 Pa. 202; 58 A. 
2d 445, 447 as follows: 
"Both grounds of constitutional invalidity, 
so reckoned with by the learned court below, 
fundamentally stem from the fictional situa-
tion legally supplied by the 'original package' 
idea, first developed by Chief Justice Marshall 
in Brown v. Maryland, 1827, 12 Wheat U. S. 
419, 6 L. ed. 678, and ever since scrupulously 
observed by the courts of this country. * * *" 
(Italics ours) . 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reason that the statute requ1nng the 
appellant foreign corporation to qualify to do business 
in Utah is repugnant to the commerce clause of the 
Constitution of the United States when applied to 
transactions in commerce between the states, and 
that, under the original package doctrine, all the sales 
concerned herein are sales of goods still in commerce 
between the states, appellant respectfully requests 
this honorable court to modify the judgment entered 
below by adding to it the sum of $7,458.10, with 
interest at the rate of 6 per cent per year from July 
27, 1949, to date, and costs of this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Skeen, Thurman, Worsley 
& Snow, Verl C. Ritchie, and 
Earl D. Tanner. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
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